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ABSTRACT 
Out of the collapse of the commercial groundfish and salmon fisheries in 
Newfoundland and Labrador (NL) in 1992 and the resultant economic crisis, the 
provincial and federal governments implemented a new strategy for developing a high-
value recreational salmon and trout fishing industry in the province. The goals were to 
create local employment opportunities in rural Newfoundland, devise improved resource 
management strategies at the community level, and foster an overall improvement in 
environmental stewardship through enhanced local decision-making. The program that 
emerged to achieve those goals came to be known provincially as community watershed 
management (CWM), an approach to resource management that aimed to share 
significant decision-making authority and management with local/regional non-
governmental watershed groups. This new approach constituted a “rescaling” of 
governance, a term that describes the move from centralized modes of provincial and 
federal management policies, towards local and regional empowerment in the 
management of natural resources. Ultimately, the program did not achieve the intended 
level of success in the development of a recreational fishery for a number of complex 
reasons. The proposed changes to resource management became too politically 
contentious amongst stakeholders, the program failed to win support over a government 
bureaucracy resistant to structural changes, and the political will required to implement 
such an ambitious program faltered. While the provincial government’s commitment to 
rescale environmental resource management and governance to the watershed level 
ultimately did not hold, there continued, and remains, a lasting grassroots movement 
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across the province at the community level in the form of continuing watershed 
management organizations.  
This thesis fulfills two important inquiries: 1) to provide a historical overview of 
CWM and related recreational fisheries development policies in NL, and 2) to analyze the 
experiences of the organizations themselves, through the voices of their past and current 
members, as well as stakeholders in community, government, industry, and academia. 
The central argument of this paper is that implementation of rescaled environmental 
governance and management failed in NL due to a lack of secure funding and agreed 
upon longer term policy commitments, entrenched public opposition from a vocal 
minority based on fears of privatization of public resources, and lack of institutional 
readiness, both on the part of the provincial bureaucracy and the watershed organizations 
themselves. The result is that watershed organizations in NL have largely been left to 
forge their own direction. Critical to the success of this endeavor is remaining adaptive in 
nature, and integrative in approach while tackling the highly complex issues surrounding 
environmental management.  
It is my hope that these insights may assist in future capacity-building efforts for 
governments and community-based stewardship organizations that are attempting to 
implement holistic, collaborative, and multi-level environmental management in NL and 
elsewhere. This insight has been achieved through document review and by conducting 
in-depth interviews with key informants engaged in community watershed groups 
throughout the province. The interviews have been analyzed using Mitchell’s (2009) four 
contributing factors to policy implementation gaps combined with Robins’ (2007) 
multiple-capitals model for assessing and building capacity. This analytical framework 
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allows for a critique of the strengths, challenges, and short-comings of small-scale, 
community-based watershed groups, an area of research that is weakly developed in 
academic literature. Significant institutional, social, and environmental learning that has 
occurred in these organizations and been captured through this research provides us with 
the building blocks for better future outcomes in community-based environmental 
stewardship practiced through local and multi-level decision-making and inclusive 
governance. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
Within the province of Newfoundland and Labrador (NL), watershed 
management at the community level began to formalize in the early 1990s. Out of the 
decline and collapse of the commercial fisheries in 1992, the provincial and federal 
governments sought to identify, fund, and help innovate for economic development 
opportunities at local and regional levels. A key recommendation of various consultants 
and commissions within this period was investment in recreational inland fisheries, as 
well as experimentation with community-based resource management in order to develop 
this potential (Buchanan et al. 1994, House 1999). A community-based approach sought 
to localize benefits from the recreational fishery through economic development and 
increased employment, and to improve environmental management through a more 
inclusive and consensus-based approach (McNeil 1997). In the context of the fisheries 
collapse, it is difficult to overstate the imperative to create local employment in rural NL 
at this time. Equally, it is difficult to overstate the imperative to reform fisheries 
management and environmental stewardship practices in the wake of this historic 
collapse. As such, in many ways and forms, a crisis created unique opportunities. 
Between 1994 and 1996 the provincial and federal governments initiated two 
separate programs to accomplish an inclusive and consensus-based approach to 
environmental management: a watershed management “pilot project,” and a Model 
Rivers program in which funding for decentralized, community-based resource 
management (CBRM) was provided to bolster fish stocks, modernize environmental 
management practices, and create local employment opportunities (Allan 1996). This 
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experimental approach came to be known as community watershed management (CWM) 
(Allan 1996). Subsequently, five watershed groups were either created or identified 
through existing organizations as the recipients of a cost-shared federal/provincial 
funding program over a five-year trial period. After that initial trial period, some of these 
community watershed groups continued to operate while others did not. This thesis 
explores the implementation gap of the CWM experiment by providing the political and 
social context in which the program was situated, as well as an analysis of the capacity-
related challenges that watershed organizations have faced in NL. 
 
1.1 Problem Statement 
 Mitchell (2009) describes the implementation gap between policy and practice as 
a result of four elements: complexity of the systems being managed, conflict amongst 
stakeholders, uncertainty about how natural systems work, and change because of both 
human and natural systems existing in constant flux and adjustment. In the context of NL, 
governmental experimentation with CWM and with community-based resource 
management more broadly has proven to be challenging at best. Of the five organizations 
that secured some level of funding under the 1996 provincial pilot project and Model 
Rivers program, only one remains in existence in a multi-dimensional stewardship 
capacity. The Indian Bay Ecosystem Corporation (IBEC) has endured since its inception 
in 1988 with fluctuating levels of organizational support and efficacy over the years. 
Since baseline government funding ceased after the initial pilot period, the organization 
has pushed forward in largely project-based work through securing grants and funding for 
research and stewardship initiatives from provincial and federal sources, private donors 
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and environmental NGOs, as well as the academic community. At present, the future of 
IBEC is highly uncertain due to its inability to secure longer-term funding commitments 
from government or other agencies (Pers. Comm., multiple).  
Several other watershed groups exist in NL today that vary greatly in scale, 
dimension, and application (Vodden et al. 2013). However the focus of this research will 
remain within the scope of the five organizations involved in the pilot projects and Model 
Rivers program. Those organizations were: IBEC; the Bay St. George South 
Development Association; the Humber River Watershed Management Association; the 
Gander River Management Association (GRMA); and the Sandwich Bay Watershed 
Management Association.  
Now 20 years later, no clear future directions are apparent for watershed 
management at the community level in NL, nor is there any current policy around CWM. 
Indeed, CWM as a policy program in NL is no longer practiced nor is there formalized 
support for localized decision-making in resource management at the watershed scale. 
While watershed management continues to be practiced to this day in very meaningful 
ways, in varying capacities, experimentation with CWM, the specific policy program, 
formally ended 1999 in the wake of public backlash and the Tobin Government’s Our 
Smiling Land document (see Chapter 4). 
 
1.2 Purpose Statement 
 The purpose of this research is to identify the successes, challenges, and/or 
limitations of CWM as well as key opportunities for capacity building in the context of 
small-scale, rural, multi-use watershed organizations in NL. Capacity in this context is 
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defined as the ability of an organization to carry out work and fulfill its mandate and is 
considered important within this study because the survival and success of these small, 
independent organizations is dependent on their existing capacities and capacity-building 
(and maintenance) skills.  
CWM was one of the first instances of a management arrangement resembling a 
multi-stakeholder commitment focused at the local level in the province. As such, it was 
an early iteration of integrated management at the watershed level. Integrated resource 
management approaches embody the holistic attempt to manage a diversity of 
environmental resources, stakeholders, and socio-ecological interests within a given 
space (Bakker 2006). This experimentation with an integrated approach provided 
opportunities to learn from the experience.  
Moreover, there exists a literature gap in the experience of small-scale rural 
watershed groups that aspire to integrated management approaches (Vodden 2009; 
Robins 2007). One review of Canada-wide watershed group capacities undertaken by 
Robins (2007) excluded NL on the basis of criteria relating to scale. The focus of 
watershed research undertaken by Robins and others is largely fixed on larger-scale 
organizations and regions, rather than on small-scale, rural watershed organizations. In 
exploring implementation barriers and capacity building efforts for CWM in NL, this 
research will contribute to the literature related to small-scale, rural, watershed 
management organizations and their unique challenges. 
In summary, this research has been conducted for two important purposes: 1) to 
provide a historical overview of CWM and related recreational fisheries development in 
NL, providing key policy insights, and 2) to analyze the experiences of the organizations 
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themselves, through the voices of their members and committed stakeholders in 
community, government, industry, and academia as a basis for future capacity-building 
for community-based stewardship organizations that may attempt holistic, collaborative, 
and multi-level environmental management in NL and elsewhere.  
While all five organizations involved in the CWM pilot projects and Model 
Rivers program were examined, the primary location for this inquiry has been the Indian 
Bay watershed in central Newfoundland. IBEC as an ongoing organizational entity is 
used as a case study for examining CWM as a policy approach in NL as well as potential 
linkages between watershed management and organizational capacity-building through 
adherence to integrative principles, including challenges and successes in attempting to 
create these linkages.  
 
1.2.1 Research questions 
Pursuant to this purpose, this research has endeavoured to answer the following 
research questions: 
 
1. What factors led to the rise and eventual discontinuation of Community 
Watershed Management as a provincial policy approach? 
• What roles have watershed groups played in the scheme of management, 
economic development, governance, and/or policy formation?  
• How do these roles compare to the original intent of the policy? 
• What implementation challenges were present in the context of NL’s rural 
watershed management organizations and related provincial policy? 
 
2. What are the key challenges, successes, and limitations that smaller scale, 
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non-governmental, rural watershed management organizations face?  
• What capacities do watershed management organizations have for 
overcoming these challenges and limitations or building on their 
successes?  
• How have these capacities been built over time? 
 
 The significance of this research lies in the gap between CWM as a policy option, 
and the reality of struggling organizations related to their capacity, financial and 
otherwise, to meet their mandate and accomplish the ideals of integrated management at 
the watershed level. Indeed the results of this study suggest that implementation of CWM 
has not been an easy process – now 20 years after the initial pilot project launch in NL, 
CWM as a provincial policy has ended and these watershed groups have either entirely 
disbanded, or are struggling to survive. No comparable study to date has been undertaken 
to assess or evaluate the experience with CWM originally conceived in the 1996 pilot 
project and Model Rivers program.   
 
1.3 Methodology and Methods 
 This research is primarily qualitative, undertaken from an interpretivist 
perspective, which recognizes that research is influenced by the values or goals of the 
researcher and that reality may vary, across time, individuals or cultures for example 
rather than being deterministic (Patterson and Williams 1998). This research uses a 
comparative perspectives of CWM experiences in NL, but with IBEC as a primary case 
study of a watershed organization from the initial pilot project in 1996. IBEC as an 
organizational entity, and the Indian Bay watershed, is a major focus of the research. 
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Document review and interviews are primary data sources, analyzed through the use of a 
conceptual framework described further below. In addition to academic sources accessed 
to library databases, documents were analyzed from the archives of watershed 
organizations, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, the Centre for Newfoundland Studies, as 
well as personal archives of current and former stakeholders. 
1.3.1 Conceptual framework and analysis 
Conceptual frameworks are most commonly associated with qualitative research, 
and are further defined as “products of qualitative processes of theorization” (Jabareen 
2009, 50). Additionally, the framework possesses ontological, epistemological, 
axiological, and methodological assumptions that require triangulation in order for 
validity within the paradigmatic operation (Jabareen 2009). McCaghie et al. (2001) 
describe the conceptual framework as serving two critical functions: 1) identifying the 
research variables, and 2) clarifying the relationships amongst those variables. Under 
these guiding principles, a conceptual framework has the potential to scaffold the 
research data and therefore assist in making meaning of research findings (Smyth 2004). 
The first key elements of the conceptual framework for this study are the concepts 
of integrated and community-based watershed management, discussed further in Chapter 
2. The significance of integrated in this context is the participatory approach to managing 
a resource in which all voices are heard. These terms and the related set of ideas draw 
attention to the importance of localized and shared decision-making in the management 
of natural resources within the watershed. Second, Mitchell’s four contributing factors to 
policy implementation gaps (complexity of the systems being managed, conflict amongst 
stakeholders, uncertainty about how natural systems work, and change within human and 
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natural systems existing in constant flux and adjustment) have defined the dimensions of 
the policy-related challenges that must be overcome in order to succeed. Third and 
finally, Robins (2007) provides a conceptual framework for understanding the critical 
elements involved in capacity building for a watershed organization (see Table 1).  
 
Four Capitals Capacity-Building Framework 
 
Human Capital 
 
                              Social Capital  
Institutional 
Capital 
 
Economic Capital 
Cognitive 
(social norms) 
Structural 
(networks) 
• Knowledge 
• Skills 
• Experience 
• Trust and 
reciprocity 
• Values, 
attitudes and 
behaviour 
• Commitment 
• Motivation 
• Sense of place 
• Networks 
• Relationships 
• Governance 
arrangements 
• Infrastructure 
• Financial 
resources 
Table 1. A conceptual framework for understanding the elements of capacity building 
(Robins 2007). 
 
A focus on capacity was added to address what was perceived as a key missing 
element in Mitchell’s four contributing factors. Capacity has been documented as a key 
factor in the outcomes of watershed management efforts and is critical to an 
organization’s ability to cope with and adapt to complexity, conflict, uncertainty and 
change (2007, 2015). This framework is built from the multiple-capitals theoretical 
approach to capacity building: the integration of social, human, institutional, and 
economic elements of capacity, or capitals that comprise an integrated model for 
understanding and assessing capacity at varying levels, such as that of an organization, 
community, region etc. (eg. Beckley et al. 2008; Mendis-Millard and Reed 2007; Putnam 
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1993). The so-called “four-capital model” was first articulated by Ekins (1992), and 
provides a holistic representation and basic requirement of capacity-building activities 
(Robins 2008). These four capitals coalesce and contrast in order to determine relative 
strengths, weaknesses, and opportunities for future organizational capacity-building. The 
notion of adaptive capacity, presented by Plummer and Armitage (2014) is also taken into 
account in recognition of Mitchell’s four policy challenges noted above. 
 This framework was used to help frame the study, generating interview questions 
for example, that explore the capacity potential of non-governmental watershed 
organizations in the form of a multiple-capitals approach to capacity-building. It was also 
used in the analysis of data to assist in identifying implementation challenges, important 
capacity variables and their relationships. Interviews were manually transcribed and 
coded deductively for elements in Mitchell’s and Robins’ frameworks. Patterns were also 
sought that did not necessarily relate directly to any one element of the framework in an 
attempt to ensure the framework guided but did not restrict potential findings. Finally, 
contrast and comparison between watershed groups throughout NL and the rest of 
Canada (through literature review) provided additional insights. 
 
1.3.2 Case study  
 Stake (2006) describes a case study as a system with working, purposive parts that 
lends itself well to qualitative and quantitative research alike. As Stake (2006) further 
describes, the qualitative case study “was developed to study the experience of real cases 
operating in real situations” in which it will “reflect complex, situated, problematic 
relationships” (10). In relation to the challenges and successes associated with watershed 
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organizations in Newfoundland and Labrador (NL), this case study has accordingly 
examined the complex relationships involved within a particular context. Overall design 
of an effective case study encompasses a problem definition, rigorous design, data 
collection, data analysis, composition and ultimately reporting (Yin 1984).  
The rationale for selecting IBEC as a primary focus for this study is that it is the only 
remaining organization of the five original pilot projects that continues to exist and 
embody a multi-dimensional stewardship mandate at the local/regional watershed level in 
NL1. Moreover, the organization has demonstrated a level of adaptive capacity and 
resilience, as it continues to operate today, almost 30 years since its inception. IBEC was 
one of the five groups involved in the CWM pilot project/Model River planning 
programs in the mid 1990s that was originally funded through the Cooperation 
Agreement for Salmonid Enhancement/Conservation (CASEC), a federal/provincial 
agreement to revitalize and develop the NL salmonid industry. It is the only organization 
of these five that still exists today as functioning within its original mandate. It therefore 
provides an important opportunity to analyze the ways in which this organization has 
been able to sustain itself while others have not. The organization is in many ways a 
different or evolved iteration of its former self, as time has passed and priorities shifted, 
while still maintaining a core mandate. As such, it is a uniquely instructive case for 
learning and capacity-building for watershed management in NL and beyond. 
                                                
1 A community group on the Gander River has as of 2014 re-established a presence as the Gander River 
Ecosystem Corporation (GREC), which is a non-profit community group, concerned with the health of the 
Gander River watershed and protecting wild Atlantic Salmon populations. As it was not part of the original 
CWM program, GREC is not considered within the confines of this study related to particular CWM issues. 
It is however looked to for broader examples of resiliency and resurgence of community-based watershed 
initiatives in NL.  
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 An additional element of the organization’s uniqueness is that, at least originally, 
the species-orientation of the recreational development efforts was towards trout and not 
salmon. For this reason, the organization operates somewhat within a category of its own 
relative to the other watershed groups involved in the CWM program of the 1990s. While 
there are some efforts towards salmon angling in the way of habitat restoration and creel 
surveying, in Indian Bay the focus has always been the famous, trophy-sized brook trout.  
 
1.3.3 Qualitative in-depth interviews 
It is important that researchers choose the right techniques for data collection and 
analysis, as well as to understand those techniques well enough to employ them properly 
and within the proper contexts (Babbie 1998). The qualitative, interpretivist research 
approach lends itself well to some particular methods more than others. Mertens (2010) 
describes how interviews, document reviews, and formal observation are the leading 
methods employed within this paradigm. This research uses in-depth interviews as the 
primary method of inquiry, with archival document review serving as supplementary 
data.  
Interviews were conducted from November 2013 to September 2015. 
Interviewees included current and former board members of IBEC and other watershed 
groups in the province, as well as other key stakeholders within the organizations and 
communities more broadly. These individuals included founding members and key 
political actors at the local and provincial levels. The interviews were semi-structured in 
nature, with the intent of opening the floor for the interviewee to share and create new 
knowledge. The 22 interviews ultimately conducted included:  
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• 8 IBEC-affiliated interviewees 
• 8 other watershed group-affiliated interviewees (FABEC, ERMA, 
BSGSSG, ACAP, Humber, GRMA, GREC, Sandwich Bay) 
• 2 federal DFO-affiliated interviewees 
• 2 provincial government-affiliated interviewees (IBRD, ERC) 
• 1 NLWF-affiliated interviewee 
• 1 former outfitter/lodge owner 
 
In reality, many interviewees have performed multiple roles over the years, both 
professionally and personally, and so there is considerable overlap beyond and across the 
categories denoted above. The interviews were conducted in-person where and whenever 
possible; only three telephone interviews were conducted for practical purposes. 
Interviews followed a scripted guideline based around Robins’ multiple-capitals 
framework (see Appendix A for the interview guideline) but allowed both the interviewer 
and respondents to follow related lines of inquiry.  
An important aspect of the construction of the interview guideline was the 
flexibility to adapt to new circumstances. Research is a process of continuous change, 
design change, and reformulation (Kvale and Brinkman 2009). The interview guideline 
served as exactly that: a guide to a purposive conversation. Indeed, flexibility and the 
allowance for change when dealing with such variables are critical (Mertens 2010). As 
continuous learning and adapting to new circumstances created through that learning 
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process necessitates change over time, it was important to use the conceptual framework 
to ground but not restrict the interview process. 
 
1.3.4 Document review 
 Documents for this study were selected on the basis of relevance, both 
historically, in the development of a specific historical narrative, and politically, in the 
pursuit of a grounded understanding of policies, programs, and institutions related 
specifically to CWM and CASEC. Documents were drawn primarily from the archival 
collection at the Centre for Newfoundland Studies, as well as from community watershed 
organizations’ private archives. Primary documents included promotional literature on 
government program funding, academic studies, consultancy reports and feasibility 
studies, and internal memoranda and correspondence within organizations, including 
meeting minutes and transcripts of publicly held forums. Documents were analyzed 
primarily through an inductive approach on the basis of the above-noted relevance but 
with deductive aspects, seeking information related to the research questions and 
conceptual framework detailed above. 
 
1.3.5 Ethics in Research 
 This research relies on the insights of human participants knowledgeable about  
capacity issues in environmental management at the organizational and watershed level. 
Because of this human participation, special consideration is required. In accordance with 
the Grenfell Campus Research Ethics Board, the proper clearances have been granted 
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(GCREB Reference number: 20140659). Recorded (19) as well as un-recorded (3) 
interviews were the primary means of gaining first-hand, primary source data. Un-
recorded interviews were conducted at the interviewee’s request. Concerns relating to 
privacy and confidentiality have been thoroughly addressed. The interview content, 
subsequent analysis and reporting have focused not on the individual, but rather on the 
broader issues within the field of study. Personal information and identification of 
interviewees thus has not been revealed. Signed consent has been strongly encouraged by 
all participants, though verbal consent has been obtained and considered sufficient in the 
case of interviews conducted via telephone. Interviewees have acknowledged an express 
understanding that participation has been voluntary, and that withdrawal was welcomed 
at any point throughout the study.  
 One further ethical consideration is the admission of this researcher’s proximity to 
and familiarity with the particular case study. Prior to conducting formal interviews with 
participants connected to IBEC in and around Indian Bay, NL, the researcher spent the 
summer of 2013 in that town conducting work as part of a separate but related research 
project on drinking water quality within the community. The researcher was partially 
employed by IBEC throughout this period. A requirement of this position was to engage 
with the public as well as IBEC’s board of directors to access information on issues 
relating to drinking water quality in the immediate area.  
Having lived and worked in the Town of Indian Bay in this period, and working 
closely with both IBEC and the community, these are important admissions in terms of 
the positionality of the researcher. England (2006) defines positionality as the ways in 
which people will inevitably view the world differently through “embodied” positions of 
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ourselves relative to others. Because of the proximity, previous working experience, and 
resulting relationship building with the community, the objectivity and detachment of the 
researcher has inevitably been affected. However, the nature of this research, from an 
exploratory, qualitative perspective requires such interpersonal developments (Stake 
2010). In the name of diligence, the researcher has sought to strike a balance between 
interpersonal development for the sake of knowledge creation on the one hand, while 
nullifying or minimizing bias on the other (Mertens 2010). This has been achieved 
through regularly considering how positionality might be affecting analysis of research 
findings, and honestly and openly addressing those concerns throughout the text. Having 
said this, this positionality needs to be recognized as a strength. As the research and the 
researcher’s perspective is grounded in lived experience, this adds to the depth of analysis 
of this inquiry. 
 
1.5 Overview 
The forthcoming chapters will be presented in the following manner: 
Chapter 2 will focus on relevant literature in the fields of rescaled environmental 
management and governance, community-based and Integrated Watershed Management 
and capacity-building at the watershed level. This chapter will further outline the 
conceptual framework of the “four-capitals” approach to capacity-building at the 
organizational/institutional level, and relate it to the implementation gap problem of 
Mitchell’s description.  
Chapter 3 will provide a background on the history and political implications of 
natural resource development in NL with respect to commercial and recreational 
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fisheries, new approaches to resource management in the face of crisis, and the 
imperative to change and adapt. This chapter will review the CWM policy program, its 
origins in the fisheries crises, and the attempt to develop a recreational fishing industry in 
rural NL. It will detail how seemingly as quickly as its rise, CWM and associated broader 
commitments to rescaled fisheries and watershed management unraveled in the face of 
bureaucratic obstruction, lack of institutional readiness, and small but vocal grassroots 
political opposition in the name of ‘traditional rights’ and common pool access to outdoor 
resources. Finally, this chapter will provide a case study on IBEC as an institution that 
has evolved, adapted, and proven resilient in meeting its mandate in the almost 30 years 
of the organization’s existence. 
Chapter 4 will revisit of the concepts of CWM and Integrated Watershed 
Management (IWM), while making a case for IWM as a holistic and resilient policy 
option for watershed management at the local and regional levels. Further, an argument 
will be made for a more integrated and resilient theoretical model of IWM, one that may 
better serve the holistic interests of watershed areas and the communities within them. 
This chapter will draw conclusions related to capacity-building and organizational 
resilience, and also discuss adaptive capacity in the face of ever-changing political 
priorities, economic and environmental realities. These findings relate back to the 
conceptual and analytical frameworks by which the analysis was framed. By examining 
organizational capacity in the face of and in relation to persistent policy implementation 
problems, we may propose avenues through which to achieve better future outcomes. 
Chapter 5 will draw overall conclusions, future directions, as well as potential 
policy options for watershed management in NL, both now and into the future. 
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Chapter 2. Reviewing the Literature 
2.1 Governance and the Rescaling of Environmental Management 
Government and governance are terms used to describe the ways in which a 
people in question are governed, or govern themselves. Government describes the 
institutional authority vested in deciding outcomes, whereas governance describes a 
decision-making process and who ultimately gets to decide (Bakker 2006). An extreme 
and idealized distinction between the two concepts, for the purpose of example, is that 
government represents a top down approach in which decision-making power is 
hierarchical and centralized, whereas governance is a flattened schematic based on power 
sharing, networks, and collaboration (Weiss 2000).  
Abrams et al. (2003, 11) define governance in the following way: “Governance is 
the interactions among institutions, processes, and traditions that determine how power is 
exercised, how decisions are taken on issues of public and often private concern, and how 
citizens or other stakeholders have their say.” Gibson (2014, 32) describes four common 
elements of governance: process, in which formal and informal arrangements are 
involved; collaboration amongst diverse local and regional actors that take part in the 
process; collective decision-making that will ultimately strive for, though in reality not 
necessarily achieve, consensus; and finally, engagement beyond government in a 
process involving all stakeholders (government and non-government) through an 
“autonomous and legitimate organization.” Increased local control and self-organization 
are corner stones of effective governance arrangements. Without these qualities, 
governance does not exist in a functional sense, but rather traditional government perhaps 
with certain aspects of downloading of their responsibilities (Vodden 2009).  
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Other authors have highlighted a similar type of governance arrangement in co-
management: the sharing of responsibility and decision-making amongst interested 
parties as part of a multi-level rescaling of governance (Plummer and Arai 2005; 
Plummer and Armitage 2010). In some cases, the same general devolution of 
responsibilities and decision-making has been recommended in other natural resource 
fields such as forestry and fisheries (Agrawal 2003; Armitage 2005; Marshall 2007; Ribot 
2002).  
This shifting of responsibility from centralized governmental ‘command and 
control’ type governance not only seeks to promote arrangements more resembling 
“bottom-up” local governance in dealing with persistent issues such as development and 
climate change (Brandes and Maas 2006), but presents significant opportunities for local 
participation and collaboration in the decision-making process (Stedman et al. 2009). 
Moreover, collaborative and multi-level governance is purported to enhance efficiency, 
equity, democracy, and accountability in the management of complex ecosystems (Ribot 
2002). 
The term collaborative governance, as a particular governance form, is in large 
part a reaction to the failures of traditional, technocratic centralized government 
arrangements (Ansell and Gash 2007). Because governance as a current concept is in 
principle collaborative, democratic, and participatory, the term collaborative governance 
almost represents a tautology. It is nonetheless a useful term in explicating collaborative 
governance as a shared and iterative process. Collaborative governance at its core 
attempts to “create, interpret and apply policy through the participation of multiple 
stakeholders” (Gibson 2014, 38). It is this multi-stakeholder approach, involving non-
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traditional policy actors in the process of decision-making, that defines collaborative 
governance (Gibson 2014). Collaborative governance involves sharing of knowledge, 
resources, power, and responsibilities. Vodden (2015, 168) explains that “by identifying 
and developing shared goals, norms, and even values through both formal and informal 
governance processes and structures, synergies are created that allow collaborators to 
achieve more together than individually” (from Longoria 2005). 
Vodden (2015) points out that “watershed management is one of the oldest and 
most widespread forms of collaborative governance in North America” (from Lubell et 
al. 2002, 170), and that water governance and management more specifically is a subject 
of evolving structures and processes. At the federal and provincial levels, Bakker (2006, 
16) describes government policy in this respect as being at a “crossroads” with respect to 
approaches to water governance and water management.2 Numerous authors describe a 
move, or rescaling, in recent years towards decentralized modes of water governance 
(Andonova and Mitchell 2010; Bakker 2006; de Loe and Plummer 2010; Fabricius and 
Cundell 2010; Plummer and Armitage 2010). An important element of this rescaling is 
adherence to the principle of subsidiarity. Marshall (2007, 4) describes subsidiarity in the 
following way: “Any particular task should be decentralized to the lowest level of 
governance with the capacity to conduct it satisfactorily.” This attempt to rescale 
environmental management opens opportunities at the local and regional levels for local 
                                                
2 As Bakker (2006) describes, ‘water governance’ and ‘water management’ are not interchangeable terms. 
Water governance refers to the policy decision-making process and ‘who gets to decide,’ whereas water 
management refers to the operational approaches used to make those decisions. This research takes into 
account both of these definitions. Ultimately, the desired outcome is better management, though we obtain 
the tools to fulfill this aim through better governance. While there is great overlap in definitions and 
applications, this is an important distinction between the two concepts, which this research endeavors to 
elucidate.   
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and ‘non-state’ actors to participate in the process (Boyd and Folke 2012; de Loe and 
Kurtzwiser 2007).  
Despite the recognized benefits, it should be noted there are legitimate concerns 
regarding governance arrangements. Many fear that traditional governments are ill-
equipped and perhaps institutionally incapable of sharing in decision-making processes 
(House 1999). In many cases, concerns over downloading responsibilities without 
providing the necessary resources to carry out those responsibilities, as distinguished 
from true power sharing in the decision-making process, are well-founded (Vodden et al. 
2013).  
 
2.1.3 Environmental governance 
Governance in the realm of environmental concerns tackles the limitations to 
conventional “command and control” approaches to environmental management and is 
recognized throughout academic literature as a means to bridging the shortcomings of 
traditional approaches (eg. Holling and Meffe 1996; Kettl 2001; Weiburst and 
Meadowcroft 2014). Governance approaches aimed towards environmental management 
do emerge with slightly different names, and indeed can take divergent meanings (e.g. 
adaptive governance, adaptive co-management, co-governance) and differ in their points 
of emphasis. However, consistent with the collaborative governance approach presented 
above, Plummer and Armitage (2014, 5) argue that there is a common thread in that 
“making environmental governance operational requires collaboration among 
heterogeneous actors with diverse interests, institutions that are flexible and nested across 
scales and levels, and analytic deliberation that develops understanding through multiple 
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knowledge systems.” Through this lens, I view the ideal as well as practical task of 
watershed management as an integrated, holistic approach that embraces multi-level and 
collaborative governance efforts as a way of guiding management of complex socio-
ecological watershed systems, in this case in the context of NL. 
 
2.1.2 The watershed as a unit of management and governance 
Arguably, the watershed is an ideal unit in which to engage in ecosystem-based 
governance and, ultimately, management because its boundaries are largely natural rather 
than purely political or an otherwise human in their construction (Pereira 1989; Slocombe 
1998). Often synonymously referred to as drainage basin, river basin, or catchment, a 
watershed may be defined as a “geographic area consisting of all land that water flows 
across, under, and through on its way to a particular body of water” (Vodden 2009, 204). 
These terms describe an area comprised, importantly, of a hydrologic cycle taking place 
within a distinct and unique ecosystem. Because of this mostly natural boundary along 
hydrologic lines, the watershed is considered an ideal unit from which to manage varying 
layers of resources within that particular ecosystem (de Loe and Kurtzwiser 2007).  
While the concept of the watershed has alternately been referred to as a 
“patchwork of socioeconomic and biophysical processes” (Fight et al. 2000, 1), 
suggesting that watersheds are as much drawn along socio-political boundaries as natural 
ones, the watershed level holds as a highly credible unit for localized environmental 
management (Bakker 2006). Watersheds can be drawn along various and nested scales, 
which can also be merged into much broader river basins for larger levels of 
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administration and management, allowing for adaptation and flexibility in management 
design (Brandes et al. 2005).  
Regardless of technical ambiguities or subjectivities with respect to delineating 
watershed boundaries, the devolution of watershed management actions and policies 
must be taken in the context of watersheds and the human communities in them 
(Heathcote 2009). Previous research and experience suggests a critical link between 
social, economic, and environmental footprints when discussing watershed management: 
ultimately, as a unit of environmental management, watersheds must be meaningful to the 
human actors within them. This further legitimizes the attempt to rescale environmental 
management taking ecological delineations into account together with a community-
based approach. 
A move towards watershed-level management in the context of NL, as with 
anywhere, requires consideration of the unique social and environmental features of the 
watershed or drainage basin area in question. Watershed areas in this province may be as 
large as the Gander, Humber, or Eagle Rivers, comprised of thousands of ponds and 
feeder systems, or as small as the Indian Bay watershed in the Bonavista North region, a 
catchment area of approximately 700 square kilometers, comprised of 16 ponds and 
several brooks (IBEC 2015). With adherence to appropriate scale and the need for 
integrated approaches that take into account the uniqueness of the watershed in question, 
a community-based watershed management approaches would reflect and act in 
accordance with the socio-ecological systems in question.  
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2.2 Approaches to Watershed Management 
As discussed above, rescaling towards local management presents opportunities 
and challenges with respect to shared decision-making, improved environmental 
outcomes, and models for efficiency (Wesche and Armitage 2010). The concept of 
community-based resource management (CBRM), or similarly community-based natural 
resource management, implies resource management that takes place at the local level 
with involvement and therefore an expectation of buy-in from community and regional 
stakeholders (Mountjoy et al. 2012). CBRM is described as a collaborative and 
participatory approach to resource management that recognizes the opportunity for multi-
level collaboration, involving a key role for local level actors working in collaboration 
with senior levels of government (Vodden 2009). This in turn opens significant 
opportunity for communities and local residents to engage in ecosystem management and 
environmental stewardship (Sabatier et al. 2005).  
 Common Property Theory (CPT) is an important heuristic in understanding 
resource management that is often linked to CBRM. CPT is used to explain the problems 
of managing what are called common-pool resources – primarily in the areas of fisheries 
and forests – and the risk of overuse and degradation as a result of human behaviours 
(Pokrant 2011). Seminal works in this area of research by H.S. Gordon (fisheries 
management) and Garrett Hardin (tragedy of the commons) have centered on the 
destruction of a resource as a result of uncontrolled access and under-valuation. While 
some authors have used CPT to argue for privatization and market-based approaches, a 
common focus of CPT has been the potential for small-scale, community-based 
initiatives in more effectively managing common-pool resources (Kerr 2007). As the 
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failures of “top-down” and market-based policies and management tools are increasingly 
evident, CPT has been an important guiding theory in moving towards rescaled 
approaches to resource management (Agrawal 2001). Kerr (2007) argues that watersheds 
are a common pool resource, pointing to multiple challenges with self-governance of 
common pool watersheds by local institutions. He further suggests that watershed 
management has been most successful at what he described as the microwatershed level, 
wherein local management may be nested into larger systems for broader integration of 
management rather than fractious localism. 
As a concept, CBRM is complimentary and holds similar characteristics to 
decentralized watershed management, however the term does not specifically describe 
the scale at which the management efforts take place (in this case, from the perspective of 
the watershed). The focus on CBRM in this study is watershed-specific management and 
particularly community watershed management.  
 
2.2.1 Community watershed management  
An iteration of a rescaled, community-approach to environmental resource 
management was experimented with in NL starting in the early 1990s. The specific term 
devised in this instance was community watershed management (CWM), coined in part 
through academia, the salmonid conservation community, and consulting firms 
contracted through the provincial and federal governments. As a concept, CWM sought 
to empower local decision-making in the management of primarily wild Atlantic salmon 
stocks through revised land-use management planning, for the purpose of developing a 
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recreational fishery, and ultimately towards improved environmental management 
outcomes. CWM indeed shared many characteristics with rescaled governance and 
localized management approaches such as that of CBRM. There were many purported 
environmental, social, and economic benefits of CWM (LGL 1992):  
 
1) encouragement of respect for resources and the environment,  
2) cost effectiveness,  
3) allowance for government and watershed groups to more effectively 
target key issues and challenges with respect to environmental 
management, and, 
4) the ability to localize economic benefits.   
 
The program was modeled off of extensive research of similar management/ governance 
arrangements elsewhere in the country, primarily Ontario and Quebec (Pers. Comm., 
GRMA1). As envisioned CWM was, however, a highly specific policy program that was 
uniquely tailored to the context of NL and the attempt to develop the recreational Atlantic 
salmon (and later trout) fishery While adhering to principles of CBRM, the program 
ultimately was development-focused in the arena of recreational fisheries development 
and management, and thus lacked in commitment to more holistic, dynamic principles of 
watershed management. CWM, as this paper argues, was an early iteration of a more 
integrated and collaborative environmental management program in NL that, in part 
because it lacked these aspects in terms of implementation, ultimately did not succeed. 
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CWM as a program, policy directive, and experiment with localized resource 
management in NL will be explored in further detail in Chapters 3 and 4.  
 
2.2.2 Integrated watershed management 
The concept of integrated watershed management (IWM), by contrast to the 
CWM program, embodies the holistic approach of managing a diversity of environmental 
resources and stakeholders – a suite of land-use issues more broadly – in determining 
optimal management outcomes within the given space (Heathcote 2009). IWM as a 
theoretical perspective works in complimentary fashion with CBRM and other similar 
concepts in tailoring a management approach and governance structure to the specific 
needs of the area and the communities there within.  
IWM as a theoretical perspective is an increasingly cited holistic governance 
process for achieving strong environmental management at the watershed level (Beheim 
et al. 2010). Environment Canada (2010) defines IWM as a “multi-disciplinary and 
iterative process that seeks to optimize the contribution of aquatic resources to the social, 
environmental, and economic welfare of Canadians, while maintaining the integrity of 
aquatic ecosystems, both now and into the future.” Heathcote (2009) describes IWM as 
“a continuous social process intended to move a community closer to its goals for 
environmental quality” (p. x). IWM encompasses concepts of health, well-being, and 
sustainability – it is regarded as a means to improve ecosystem health in conjunction with 
societal health and well-being, through participation, involvement, and ultimately 
improved environmental quality (Veale 2010). As far as integration of complex social 
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and environmental processes, Veale (2010, 13) identifies the process of integration as 
necessarily taking place within and along eight key areas:  
 
1) Resource issues, goals, and outcomes,  
2) Research disciplines and scientific methods,  
3) Geographic or political boundaries,  
4) Institutions (from both organizational and operational perspectives),  
5) Public and private funding,  
6) Social or sectoral systems,  
7) Spatial and temporal scales, and  
8) A wide array of stakeholders.  
 
Integration across this diverse and holistic set of categories works towards the 
development of resiliency and adaptability: resiliency in the sense of ‘hardiness’ to 
complex social and ecological change, and adaptability in the sense of coping with 
complex change and emerging new realities (Boyd and Folke 2012). IWM is multi-
dimensional and dynamic as a system of governance: it not only requires devolution of 
policy decision-making from the top-down, but requires significant buy-in from the 
bottom-up (Mitchell 2005).3 Thus in order to fully integrate towards a theoretical 
approach resembling IWM, a truly holistic vision of stakeholders working together across 
                                                
3 ‘Top-down’ may be understood as policy and decision-making authority, in this case the provincial and 
federal governments. Conversely, ‘bottom-up’ may be understood as driven by the grassroots or 
community level, from the physical places and communities that exist within them. These terms carry no 
value judgments in terms of top being ‘good’ and bottom being ‘less good.’ 
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multi-disciplinary, multi-level, and multi-stakeholder engagement must be embraced. To 
this end, IWM and adherent governance arrangements must be equipped with, or in time 
develop, the necessary capacity to meet the demands of the holistic dimensions it 
espouses. 
Figure 1 (below) depicts what Elkington (1994) first described as the “triple 
bottom line” of environmental, societal, and economic foundations for developing 
sustainable solutions to development goals in a holistic fashion. Likewise, this is the 
foundation for IWM – creating a critical link between these three bottom lines in order to 
manage all activities within a watershed in a sustainable, inclusive, holistic manner.  
   
 
Figure 1.  Aspects of integrated watershed management (Conservation Ontario 2015)  
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There are many governmental and non-governmental entities that are involved in 
the myriad of land-use issues taking place within a watershed. The challenge is to bring 
these interests together through an integrated framework of governance in order to 
maximize welfare, the public good, and environmental stewardship imperatives. The 
accounting for stakeholders across all of these interests and uses creates the foundation 
for strong governance that will ensure democratic and inclusive decision-making. IWM is 
a rational approach through which to strive towards bridging complex ecosystem 
management objectives and a diverse set of stakeholders. 
Also aligned with integrated approaches to environmental management is 
Ecosystem-based Management (EBM), a relatively new approach (McLeod and Leslie 
2012) in which managers and decision-makers meet multiple and potentially conflicting 
objectives in the pursuit of healthy and resilient ecosystems (Link 2010). EBM is diverse, 
socially inclusive, and evidence-based (Link 2010). As argued by Leslie and McLeod 
(2007), EBM embeds within it resilience through embracing connections, cumulative 
impacts, and multiple objectives, and that moving forward “requires synthesizing and 
applying knowledge from across the social and natural sciences as well as the 
humanities” (3).  
 
2.3 Capacity-building in Watershed Management 
The concept of capacity-building is broad, contains multiple meanings, and is 
diverse in its scale (Lyons and Reimer 2005). Indeed, capacity-building applies to 
development goals from those that are as far reaching as international development, to 
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rural and regional economic development, to development at the level of the institution or 
even individual (Gibbons et al. 2002). Capacity-building in rural economic development, 
environmental management, and rescaled governance are interlinked and relevant to this 
research, however this study will focus on capacity building at the level of the watershed 
institution/organization. 
Capacity building is described as both a process and an outcome, both dynamic 
and multi-dimensional (Goodman et al. 1998). The capacity building framework 
employed in this study reflects an integrated and reinforcing set of activities that address 
these individual, organizational, political, economic and structural elements (Robins 
2007). As outlined in Table 1 (Chapter 1), Robins (2007) identifies four types of capacity 
of capitals as part of this framework (human, social, institutional and economic). The 
human side to an organization relates to the people actively engaged within the 
organization itself, the ‘human resources,’ that give the organization its livelihood. Such 
qualifications relate to knowledge, skills, expertise, and experience held by members 
within a diverse group of committed members and stakeholders (Robins 2007).  
 Social capital at the organizational level relates to the organization’s relevance to 
the socio-cultural environment that it operates within. While there are many definitions of 
social capital, the concept generally refers to the “activation of actual or potential 
resources embodied in communities stemming from a durable network of relationships or 
structures of social organization” (Roman and Moore 2004, 4). In other words, social 
capital might be understood, for the purpose of this study, as an organization’s 
relationships within and across their organizations and their communities. If the 
organization does not enjoy a broader public support network, it will cease to operate in a 
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social environment that requires shared values for an organization to take off in the first 
place and support for it to continue. Robins (2007) divides social capital into two subsets: 
1) Cognitive social capital, relating to: trust and reciprocity; values, attitudes and 
behaviours; commitment; motivation; sense of place (differences, commonalities, 
importance to successes and challenges), and 2) Network social capital, relating to: 
networks, relationships, and the importance of affiliation (Robins 2007).  
Institutional capital is comprised of governance arrangements. Finally, economic 
capital is comprised of an organization’s infrastructure and financial resources available 
in order to meet its mandate, ‘keep the doors open,’ and achieve long-term financial 
sustainability. Infrastructure factors into economic capital and can be measured in terms 
of physical assets (Robins 2007). In the case of watershed groups in NL, for example, this 
could include ATVs and snowmobiles with an organizational logo for the purpose of 
conducting work within their watersheds, as well as office buildings or cabins for the 
purpose of research operations. These assets are multi-functional, as they not only allow 
organizations to carry out their daily work, but become awareness raising capacity-
building tools by way of establishing a presence on the landscape. 
Tamas (2011) describes the dimensions of a capacity building framework: 
 
Values: The beliefs, cultures, attitudes, incentives and motivations of the people in the 
system.  
 
Structure: The system's structure – its legislation, governance and policy frameworks 
and power relationships. This is sometimes called the institutional framework: roles and 
relationships and the formal and informal rules determining the interaction of a system's 
members.  
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Skills: The capabilities and competencies of the system's members defined on at least 
three levels: knowledge, attitudes and behaviours. 
   
Resources: The tools, budgets and other assets available to the system.   
 
Operations: How a system actually works – its formal and informal leadership, decision-
making and management mechanisms, strategies, business processes, accountabilities and 
other aspects of its functions.   
 
Performance: What the system actually accomplishes – the results of its activities. 
 
Applying these capacity dimensions towards watershed management 
organizations, we gain a clearer and more concise vision of what characteristics the 
organization requires to ‘succeed’ in a meaningful way. While definitions of capacity and 
capacity-building are diverse and many, there is an underlying common theme: a strong 
focus on both existing and potential abilities, resources, assets and skills (Breen 2013). In 
the context of complexity, change and uncertainty, each noted as significant challenges to 
policy implementation in complex social-ecological systems, a particularly important 
type of capacity not included within Robins’ framework is the ability to overcome 
challenges in an uncertain and ever-changing world, referred to here as adaptive capacity.  
 
2.3.1 Adaptive Capacity 
Adaptive capacity is the ability to overcome challenges in an uncertain and ever-
changing world. Its usage is most widely present in the discussion of complex issues 
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related to climate change (e.g. Smith et al. 2003), however is more broadly used in the 
realm of socio-ecological disturbances (Walker et al 2004). Plummer and Armitage 
(2010, 6) define adaptive capacity as “the ability of a social-ecological system to be 
robust to disturbance and capable of responding to change.” Folke et al. (2003) (from 
Plummer and Armitage 2010) identify four key factors that may be reflective of a social-
ecological system’s robustness to disturbance and inevitable change: 1) learning to live 
with change; 2) promoting resilience through nurturing diversity; 3) using different 
knowledge-types in collaborative ways to foster better learning; and 4) enabling the 
opportunities for self-organization in the pursuit of better and more collaborative 
environmental management. Plummer and Armitage (2010, 2) explain the usefulness of 
adaptive capacity in the following way: “Adaptive capacity provides a valuable analytic 
construct around which managers, scientists, resource users, and policy makers can come 
together in theoretically engaged but decidedly applied ways to address the challenges of 
governance.”  
Below, Figure 2 illustrates how adaptive capacity interplays between various 
forms of capacity and capitals on the one hand, and broad-based and effective governance 
on the other. The robustness of these capacity measures is critical at the 
institutional/organizational level for effective operation. As a concept, this represents a 
critical enabling factor in attempting to build multi-level governance systems for complex 
arrangements of, in this case, watershed management.  
Adaptive capacity, necessarily, involves human choice. Adaptive capacity 
represents the social and human elements of environmental management, as it is the 
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institutions and human networks that critically must adapt to a world of ever-changing 
political priorities and environmental uncertainties (Walker et al. 2004). 
 
 
Figure 2. Conceptual framework of adaptive capacity (Plummer and Armitage 2014) 
  
2.5 Overview 
This chapter has provided a review of the pertinent literature in fields relating to 
multi-level, collaborative, and environmental governance, which illustrates efforts to 
rescale environmental management in recent years. Watershed management of varying 
forms and commitments has also been reviewed, along with organizational capacity and 
capacity building. The following chapter will review the history of experimental 
community watershed management (CWM) in NL, its interconnectedness to the 
development of a recreational fishing industry, and the political and institutional 
shortcomings that ultimately led to the program’s discontinuation.   
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Chapter 3. A History of CASEC and Community Watershed 
Management in Newfoundland and Labrador 
3.1 Background 
 To adequately frame the movement towards a developed recreational fishery and 
community watershed management (CWM) in NL in the 1990s, we require an 
understanding of crises of two distinct albeit related natures occurring at the time: the 
collapse of commercial fisheries resulting in the groundfish and salmon moratoria in 
1992, and pre-existing structural employment deficiencies related to an under-diversified, 
overly resource-dependent economy. Indeed, unemployment and underemployment are 
historically chronic features of the NL economy and were not strictly the result of the 
closure of the commercial fisheries. While the moratorium put some 40,000 people out of 
work more or less over night, this was not the beginning of employment woes in the 
province. Predating the ultimate collapse of the commercial fisheries, declines had 
already been experienced in the sector and provincial unemployment had swelled to an 
annual average rate of 21.3 per cent by 1985, about twice the national average, and 
remained around that level for the next decade (House 1999).  
In response to the employment crisis of this period, the Peckford government of 
the day established the Royal Commission on Employment and Unemployment, which 
issued its final report in 1986. Entitled Building on our Strengths, the report advocated 
for an ‘integrated strategy’ for social and economic development and the creation of new 
employment opportunities (Government of NL 1985). This meant harmonizing 
government policies with regional and local initiatives, supporting rural development and 
small-scale enterprise, and fostering an overall culture of entrepreneurship in the province 
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(House 1999). The report laid the groundwork for mass and coordinated attempts at 
diversifying and modernizing the NL economy for the next decade and into the 21st 
century (House 1999). 
The ‘integrated approach’ articulated by Building on our Strengths was the 
starting point for the creation of the Economic Recovery Commission (ERC), an 
independent agency and at the time innovative new approach to economic development 
in the province. In 1989 newly elected premier Clyde Wells, with one of his election 
promises to establish an ERC within 30 days of assuming office, established his ERC 
team as an outside-of-government group that was intended to be free of government 
constraint. The team reported directly to the premier on economic advancements (Pers. 
Comm., ERC1). Doug House (1999), former chairperson of the ERC explains their 
vision:  
The Economic Recovery Commission’s vision was for the transformation of this 
economy that was too dependent on government and too dependent on the export 
of primary resources into a more self-reliant, more diversified economy with a 
strong private sector. As a shorthand, we referred to this as a transformation from 
the ‘old’ to the ‘new’ economy in Newfoundland and Labrador (19)  
 
One significant tenet of this approach was the commitment to sustainable development 
through community-based stewardship. Indeed, sound environmental management, 
sustainability, and community stewardship were emphasized as critical to the province’s 
economic and social development. This meant engaging local and regional stakeholders 
through strategies such as fostering development associations for community-based and 
regional development (House 1999).   
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The ERC also worked to create federal/provincial partnerships in economic 
development and diversification. The Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency (ACOA), 
the federal agency created in 1987 to help build capacity in the Atlantic provinces 
through enterprise and community development, has been a critical funding agency in 
achieving local and regional development goals in this province (Vodden and Hall 2013). 
Other development initiatives in this period such as Strategic Regional Diversification 
Agreements, Cooperation Agreements, and the Enterprise Newfoundland and Labrador 
Network were enabled by the work of the ERC. Figure 3 (below) provides a timeline in 
which major events and milestones took place in the development of recreational 
fisheries as a rural development policy in NL. The announcement of the Canada/ 
Newfoundland Cooperation Agreement for Salmonid Conservation/Enhancement 
(CASEC), a key enabler of CWM in NL, and related events are discussed further below. 
 
Figure 3. A timeline depicting major events in the recreational fisheries development. 
 
1989	
•  Economic	Recovery	
Commission	formed	
1990	
•  Gardner	Pinfold	
economic	statement	on	
status	of	salmon	
fisheries	
1992	
•  July	-	Moratorium	on	
commercial	cod	and	
salmon	fisheries	
•  First	articulation	of	a	
community-based	
salmon	sports	fishery	
proposed	to	the	ERC	
(O'Brien,	1992)	
•  October	-	CASEC	
Agreement	comes	into	
effect	
1994	
•  LGL	Consultants	release	
"Strategy	for	the	
Development	of	
Recreational	Fisheries	in	
Newfoundland	and	
Labrador"	
1996		
•  Pilot	projects	for	
Community	Watershed	
Management	begin	in	
Indian	Bay	and	Bay	St.	
George,	followed	by	the	
Model	Rivers	program	
on	Gander,	Humber,	
and	Eagle	Rivers	
1997	
•  CASEC	concludes	
without	renewal	
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3.1 Overview of Watershed Governance Actors in Newfoundland and Labrador 
The various interests involved in watershed governance in NL represent a cross-
section of government, non-governmental conservation organizations (from local 
grassroots, to regional, to multi-national level), industry, recreation, hunting, and angling 
groups, and Aboriginal peoples. To illustrate what the collection of watershed 
governance actors looks like in the context of NL, Table 2 details various categories of 
land use that may take place within the province’s watershed, and the agencies and 
organizations, both governmental and non-governmental, that have some involvement in 
and/or responsibility for regulating such uses. Inevitably each of these groups has a role 
to play in watershed management and governance arrangements (adapted from Hearn 
2007). 
 
Table 2. Category of Watershed Uses and Related Agencies and Interests 
Forestry (commercial and domestic) Dept. of Natural Resources 
Aboriginal governments and groups 
Corner Brook Pulp and Paper Ltd. 
Municipalities 
Model Forest 
Watershed Groups 
 
Transportation (Roads, trails) Dept. of Transportation and Works 
Aboriginal governments and groups 
Industry (e.g. forestry, mining) 
Crown Lands 
Watershed groups 
 
Agriculture (animal and crop 
production) 
Dept. of Natural Resources 
Municipalities  
Farmers and farming organizations 
Watershed groups 
 
Recreation and Tourism (including 
fisheries) 
Dept. of Tourism, Culture, and 
Recreation 
Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO) 
Dept. of Government Services 
Aboriginal governments and groups 
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Municipalities 
N&L Snowmobile Federation 
N&L Outfitters Association 
ASF/SCNL/SAEN/SPAWN 
Watershed groups 
 
Mining Dept. of Natural Resources, Mines, and 
Energy 
Aboriginal governments and groups 
Exploration companies 
Construction companies 
Watershed groups 
 
Residential/Cabin development Municipalities 
Aboriginal governments and groups 
Cabin associations 
Watershed groups 
 
3.3 Overview of Salmonid Governance in Newfoundland and Labrador 
The governance and politics regarding the recreational and commercial salmon 
fisheries in NL are extremely complex and multi-faceted. While other aquatic species are 
important to fisheries in the province (e.g. trout), the Atlantic salmon holds high priority 
by virtue of its economic, cultural and symbolic importance. Atlantic salmon and related 
policies and programs played an important role in the establishment of CWM in NL. 
Arguably, the diversity of this set of actors and their relationships in fisheries 
governance stems from aspects of culture and economy being so powerfully intertwined 
with the Atlantic salmon and the ecosystems it depends upon: “The Atlantic salmon 
represents many things to many people. It is certain that over and above its commercial 
value, the wild salmon enhances our quality of life in many ways. It has been described 
as the supreme symbol of a healthy ecosystem” (Chase 2011, 1). It is, therefore, 
necessary to begin any discussion on environmental management in this realm with an 
understanding of how much is truly at stake. The following section will introduce the 
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major interests involved in fisheries governance and management in NL, their roles in 
achieving salmonid conservation and some key related political issues, including catch 
and release, licensing and privatization. 
 
 
3.3.1 Federal and provincial governments 
As for government mandates related to recreational fisheries, the federal 
department Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO) is responsible for the preservation and 
enforcement of all laws pertaining to waters within the 29,000 kilometers of coastline in 
the NL region (DFO 2015). DFO is charged with managing Canada’s fisheries in a 
sustainable manner by enforcing the Fisheries Act and other regulations and legislation 
(Fisheries and Oceans Canada 2015). DFO therefore also manages all anadromous and 
catadromous marine species (salmon and trout, in this case) in the inland fisheries. This 
includes all harvesting related enforcement activities. The provincial government, 
meanwhile, is responsible for licensing and collection of recreational fishing license fees 
under the current Department of Fisheries and Land Resources, Wildlife Division. The 
Province also has legislative authority over access by way of licensing, manages all other 
resources within the watershed such as timber, minerals and drinking water resources, 
and acts as ancillary to the portion of DFO’s mandate to manage inland fisheries 
(Department of Environment and Conservation 2015). 
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3.3.2 Aboriginal Governments and Organizations 
Aboriginal peoples represent a vital interest in salmonid conservation in NL. 
Conservation, economic opportunity, and access for food, social and ceremonial purposes 
to ensure Aboriginal rights and interests are met are all critical factors in salmonid 
governance. On the island of Newfoundland, First Nations rights and interests were 
historically represented by the Federation of Newfoundland Indians. Today, the Mi’kmaq 
First Nations have representation through Miawpukek First Nation (Conne River) and 
Qalipu First Nation (collectively representing individual bands in Bay St. George, 
Exploits River, Gander Bay and others). These Mi’kmaq Nations and their members 
maintain significant cultural and economic ties to the vitality of their salmon bearing 
rivers (Daniels 2014). Labrador represents a different spectrum of Aboriginal rights and 
interests, with the Innu, Inuit, and NunatuKavut (Southern Inuit) also maintaining a “food 
fishery” for salmon that coincides (and sometimes competes) with other recreational and 
commercial interests. 
In 1992 the Aboriginal Fisheries Strategy was launched by DFO in response to 
the 1990 Sparrow decision by the Supreme Court of Canada that Aboriginal people have 
a right to fish for food, social and ceremonial purposes. The strategy paved the way for 
Aboriginal communities to partner with DFO in co-operative management of fisheries 
resources by way of monitoring, enforcement, and seasonal employment. As part of the 
Strategy, the Aboriginal Fisheries Guardian program was established for the purpose of 
enforcement and habitat restoration. This program has empowered Aboriginal 
communities towards self-determination and governance with regards to their fisheries 
resources, and most particularly the Atlantic salmon (Daniels 2014).  
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3.2.3 International Conservation Organizations 
Additional interests related to salmonid management and conservation range from 
grass-roots local level watershed-based committees and associations, to regional 
organizations of mid-level representation, to provincial, national and international 
organizations. Internationally, the North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization 
(NASCO) is the largest body of representation to “conserve, restore, enhance and 
rationally manage Atlantic salmon through international cooperation” (North Atlantic 
Salmon Conservation Organization 2015). The inter-governmental organization has six 
attendant parties: Canada, Denmark (including Faroe Islands and Greenland), Norway, 
the European Union, the Russian Federation and the United States. The organization 
applies the principle of the Precautionary Approach, and has attempted the development 
of an international treaty, in relation to: management of fisheries; habitat protection and 
restoration; impacts of aquaculture; stock rebuilding programmes; and use of socio-
economic factors in management decisions (North Atlantic Salmon Conservation 
Organization 2015).  
 
3.2.4 North American Angling and Conservation Organizations 
Within North America, the Atlantic Salmon Federation (ASF) is the most 
powerful conservation lobby, and has consistently pushed for increased conservation 
efforts on the part of provincial and federal governments (Daniels 2014). In more recent 
years, this lobby has been guided towards curtailment and in some cases elimination of 
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all retention fisheries of Atlantic salmon, as is the case in other Atlantic provinces 
(Atlantic Salmon Federation 2015). Headquartered in St. Andrew’s, New Brunswick, the 
ASF has a network of seven regional councils (New Brunswick, NL, Nova Scotia, Prince 
Edward Island, Quebec, Maine, and Western New England) that coordinate their 
conservation lobby efforts related to Atlantic salmon in North America (Daniels 2014). 
Trout Unlimited Canada is also heavily involved in stream and watershed restoration in 
Canada for the purpose of promoting healthy freshwater ecosystems (Wildlife Habitat 
Canada 2016). 
 
3.2.5 Newfoundland and Labrador Angling and Conservation Organizations 
The Salmonid Council of Newfoundland and Labrador (SCNL) is an important 
provincial body that brings together a diverse section of non-government organizations. 
Founded in 1979, it is an umbrella organization of various interest groups whose primary 
objectives are dedicated to management, preservation, and enhancement of salmonid 
resources in the province. Since its inception, the SCNL has been a primary advocate on 
salmonid issues, with work involved in the following (Hustins 2006):  
 
• The development of Salmon and Trout Management Plans 
• The establishment of the Cooperation Agreement for Salmonid 
Enhancement and Conservation (CASEC) 
• The moratorium on the commercial exploitation of wild salmon 
• The moratorium on small hydroelectric development  
• The growth and development of community stewardship groups  
• The conservation and restoration of salmon stocks in the province  
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• The promotion of catch and release angling 
 
The council has been instrumental in the broad-based facilitation of salmonid 
conservation in NL. The SCNL operates as the regional council of the Atlantic Salmon 
Federation (ASF). It brings together a variety of interest groups across the entire 
spectrum of conservation, industry, and recreational development within the province. As 
of 2015, the organization’s membership included seven affiliate groups (SCNL 2015): 
 
1. Salmonid Association of Eastern Newfoundland (SAEN) 
2. Salmon Preservation Association of the Waters of Newfoundland (SPAWN) 
3. Environmental Resources Management Association (ERMA) 
4. Freshwater-Alexander Bay Ecosystem Corporation (FABEC) 
5. Newfoundland and Labrador Outfitters Association 
6. Norris Arm and Area Economic Development Committee 
7. Northern Peninsula Recreational Fishers Association 
 
While organizations like SPAWN and SAEN, and outfitters interests are more broadly 
regional in their reach, the remainder of these groups are focused on specific, localized, 
watershed-based conservation activities. Other local groups in the province involved in 
SCNL as affiliate groups include IBEC, the Bay St. George Salmon Stewardship Group 
and the Ragged Harbour Working Group. While these groups are not current official 
members of the SCNL, all share a common interest of stock and habitat conservation 
with the SCNL (Hustins 2006). Vodden et al. (2013, 112) identified that there were “at 
least 13 watershed management groups across the province” as of 2013. 
 58 
Despite this common interest in salmonid conservation there is a complexity of 
issues and interests within these groups and the politics are anything but straightforward. 
Currently, based on previous research and the results of this study, for example, one of 
the most contentious issues in salmonid conservation and recreational fishery policy is 
the debate over catch and release versus retention fisheries. Powerful organizations such 
as the ASF, with the support of provincial groups like SAEN and SPAWN, advocate for 
catch and release recreational angling and a severely curtailed retention fishery. Other 
‘populist’-type groups such as the Newfoundland and Labrador Wildlife Federation 
(NLWF) and its affiliate rod and gun clubs argue that catch and release policy is harmful 
to fish populations, represents animal cruelty, and dissuades local anglers from river-front 
presence and acting as the “eyes and the ears” of the rivers in the province (NLWF 2013). 
As one interviewee bluntly stated, “I don’t want to play with my food. I don’t want to 
play the life out of that fish and then throw it back into the water to die” (Pers. Comm., 
BSG2). The debate over catch and release represents a critical divide within the angling 
and conservation community (Daniels 2014). Ultimately, this debate is of relevance 
because of at least one critical reality: Atlantic salmon stocks are performing poorly 
throughout their bio-region and are in many cases at historic low levels. The salmonid 
resource in NL is, however, “much healthier” than in the Maritimes (Fisheries and 
Oceans Canada 2015). A basic understanding of issues and themes of concern in salmon 
conservation is important in contextualizing the general politics of salmonid and 
recreational fisheries governance in this province.  
Also of critical importance to the politics of salmonid conservation in NL is the 
issue over ‘privatization’ and the perception of recreational anglers’ rights being at odds 
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with the interests of the outfitting industry and their affiliates. This controversial issue is 
discussed further below. First, I provide an overview of the history of the CWM program 
and related efforts to develop the province’s recreational fishery, which helped to fuel the 
privatizations concerns and debates that ultimately contributed to the program’s demise.   
 
3.3 Attempts to Develop the Recreational Fishery 
The recreational fishery in NL has existed for centuries, though it began to truly 
develop in the 1940s and 50s with the emerging appreciation of the pristine and ‘world-
apart’ fishing experience that NL has to offer (ASF 2012). The critical distinction 
between a recreational (and particularly commercial recreational) fishery and the more 
traditional food fishery is reflected in the combined rise of fishing as sport, a related 
emerging conservation rhetoric, and technologies in fly-fishing (Daniels 2014). It was in 
this time (the 40s and 50s), alongside an emerging conservation ethic and the figure of 
the sport fisherman,4 that catch and release became a popular, though controversial 
technique in sport and conservation (Daniels 2014).  
The value of the NL recreational fishery, culturally as well as economically, has 
long been recognized though never broadly exploited through a developed industry. In 
1990 the SCNL funded a highly influential study to provide an economic statement on 
both the recreational and commercial salmon fisheries in NL to assess the status of the 
industry under three distinct scenarios: 1) a total closure of the commercial fishery, 2) a 
                                                
4 This activity has typically been engendered by a male archetype. 
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mixed-use, zonal (de-centralized) management, and 3) a stock enhancement program 
under current exploitation patterns.  The study, conducted by Gardner Pinfold Consulting 
Economists Limited (Gardner Pinfold), concluded that the province has a wealth of 
untapped potential in a recreational fishing industry, and that it should adopt a mixed-use, 
zonal, de-centralized management structure (Scenario 2).  
Whereas other provinces such as Quebec have had successful recreational fishery 
management based on zoning and user fees (referred to as Zone d'exploitation controlee, 
or ZECs), it was argued that the once abundant resource in NL was being treated as 
having little relative value and thus over exploited while under-priced in the commercial 
fishery (Gardner Pinfold 1990). It was further stated that the development of a viable 
recreational fishing industry could ratchet up the so-called ‘value chain’ in order to more 
optimally exploit the resource, while encouraging a more broad-based conservation ethic. 
The report ultimately advocated for a properly managed recreational fishery that could 
support “a highly desirable type of sustainable development, much of which would occur 
in the form of small scale enterprises in the rural areas of the province” (Gardner Pinfold 
1990, 38).   
 
3.3.1 Catastrophe as catalyst: the introduction of CASEC 
In July 1992 the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador confronted an 
unprecedented crisis in the collapse of its commercial fisheries. While the moratorium on 
the commercial ground fishery took the headlines, being the more economically 
significant fishery, a moratorium was also imposed on the commercial salmon fishery, 
after years of diminishing returns, as depicted in Figure 4 below. Additionally, the federal 
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and provincial governments began to buy-out the licenses of commercial salmon fishers 
in the province in order to preserve the diminishing stocks. 
 
 
Figure 4. Year-over-year returns of Atlantic salmon on North American rivers (ICES 
2011) 
 
Initially pronounced as a five-year moratoria, some 24 years later these 
commercial fisheries have yet to be fully reinstated. Although the terms of a moratorium 
may be presented as a sudden and unforeseen event, commercial salmon catches had been 
declining steadily before the commercial buyout and moratoria in 1992. In the months 
directly preceding this environmental and economic catastrophe, the Province of NL 
entered into a cost-share agreement with the Government of Canada (October 1992) to 
recover and develop Atlantic salmon stocks in the province. Entitled the Canada/ 
Newfoundland Cooperation Agreement for Salmonid Conservation/Enhancement 
(CASEC), this was a five-year Cooperation Agreement in which programs would be cost-
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shared between federal and provincial governments in a 70/30 split. The agreement had 
two overarching commitments: 1) to monitor the impact of the license retirement 
program on salmon returning to NL rivers, which had already been underway, and 2) to 
develop the potential of a recreational fishery (Rowe 1997). The total value of the 
agreement was $21.43 million (though subsequently reduced to $18.43 million). This was 
in addition to the $39.1 million spent on the commercial salmon license retirement.  
 
Figure 5. A public informational brochure on CASEC (Photo by S. Holisko) 
 
The primary objective of the CASEC agreement, according to its founding 
document, was “to maximize the economic benefits to the province from the recreational 
fishery, by improving and maintaining salmonid stocks, and by improving the overall 
angling experience” for both resident and non resident anglers (CASEC 1992c, 2). 
Fundamental to this agreement was the belief that NL once had, and ought to have again, 
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robust salmon and trout stocks that provided a unique fishing experience without equal 
around the world. The agreement was comprised of five developmental programs 
(CASEC 1992c): 
 
1. Stock Assessment Program ($2.5 million) 
The initial and most important first step was to create a base-line data set for stock 
populations in the provinces some 180 scheduled rivers. In order to manage the rivers 
effectively and to make accurate projections, stock population numbers were needed that 
did not previously exist. As one interviewee put it, “we needed to know what we were 
managing.” Techniques such as creel surveys and fish (fyke) netting were used to 
determine spawning stock size, production capacity and stock status. This work provided 
the basis for all other management work. 
 
2. Salmonid Enhancement Program ($9 million) 
The largest block of funding went towards efforts to increase production on selected 
rivers in the province through stocking and fish passage improvements. Spawning, egg 
incubation, and habitat expansion were the primary efforts of this program area. 
Enhancement was used as a catalyst in hopes of bringing stocks back up to historic levels.  
 
3. Habitat Restoration and Improvement Program ($2.9 million) 
Environmental degradation and destruction of fish habitat had taken a significant toll on 
populations by the early 1990s. Work was undertaken to remove obstructions in river 
networks from both natural and man-made causes including forestry operations, and to 
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clean up from the effects of illegal dumping and effluent. A large part of this program 
played into the community engagement aspect of overall programming. Community and 
volunteer efforts were crucially important to these one-time efforts, as well as in effecting 
longer term change in attitudes and behaviors. 
 
4. Cooperative Enforcement Program ($2.8 million) 
This program coordinated efforts between federal and provincial governments, and 
communities, regarding habitat protection and illegal fishing. The federal DFO is charged 
with ultimate enforcement authority, however some of that authority was delegated to the 
provincial and community levels in the form of projects such as River Watch, an 
enforcement program that trained locals in basic fisheries enforcement. Community 
engagement and education were critical aspects of the enforcement program, as well as in 
efforts to change attitudes and behaviors towards illegal fishing. 
 
5. Strategic Planning and Industry Development Program ($1.03 million) 
This program directly supported the management and development of the recreational 
fishery in the province. Planning initiatives including research, pilot projects, regional 
conferences and seminars, and external consultations were funded through this program. 
Industry development included support for a modified guide licensing system, developing 
potential for the guiding and outfitting sector, and standardizing the guiding and 
outfitting industry.  
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Each program had a manager and a specific budget allocation (as denoted above). 
There was a clear commitment to a broad suite of scientific, economic, social and cultural 
factors in the overall development of a recreational fishery. This was a concerted and 
serious commitment towards developing local economic opportunities while effectively 
and sustainably managing the salmon and trout resource (Pers. Comm., multiple). 
Community-based watershed organizations were envisioned as playing a role in virtually 
all aspects of the program.  
Fundamentals of the strategic aims of CASEC were derived directly from the dire 
consequences of the fisheries moratoria: sound environmental stewardship and economic 
diversification were crucial features of a strategy for a recovered and resilient NL 
economy, as set out by the ERC. Alistair Allan (1995) describes how the fisheries 
closures brought about two significant changes in public thinking: “First, the realization 
that the very survival of rural fishing communities depends on alternative local economic 
opportunities, and secondly, that without responsible stewardship a seemingly 
inexhaustible natural resource could be exploited to the brink of extinction” (85). Thus, it 
was argued, by placing value on the resource in the context of a high value-added 
industry couched within local economic development opportunity, renewed 
environmental stewardship and sustainable resource use, a recreational fishery in rural 
NL could ideally flourish. Importantly, in addition to this proponents argued, a 
conservation ethic from a grass-roots level could take root.  
In order to conserve and enhance stocks, while reversing habitat degradation and 
providing local economic opportunities, key principles were articulated in the 
development process (from Allan 1995): 
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Sustainability 
• Conservation and enhancement of stocks must take first priority. This is 
the foundation to any future endeavors. 
 
Partnership 
• The two governments of jurisdictional responsibility (federal and 
provincial) needed to work together in partnership with community 
management groups and other key stakeholders. 
 
Stewardship 
• The users of the resource, and the watershed more generally, ought to take 
prime responsibility for the management of the watershed.  
 
Cost Recovery 
• The cost of watershed management should be borne by the users of the 
resource. Those who benefit from the resource ought to bear the cost, in 
proportion to the benefit received. 
 
Less Government 
• Government should reduce its role in management of the resource, while 
maintaining legislative responsibility and fulfilling its legal mandate. 
 
The articulation of these principles played an important role in framing the discourse on 
the recreational fishery and community-based resource management, particularly CWM. 
The agreement initially applied exclusively to the management of Atlantic salmon, 
though through successful lobbying the Province had Brook trout added to the agreement 
in recognition of their conservation, scientific, and development potential (Pers. Comm., 
IBEC6).  
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3.3.3 Further Developments in the Recreational Fishery 
In October 1994 a report was prepared for CASEC to advise on the development 
of a recreational fishing industry in the province. Entitled Strategy for the Development of 
Recreational Fisheries in Newfoundland and Labrador, this report, referred to as the 
LGL Report (Buchanan et al. 1994), laid the groundwork for an ambitious strategy of 
recreational fisheries diversification and development. At its heart, the report 
recommended three strategic areas of focus for maximizing the economic benefits of 
recreational fisheries development (Buchanan et al. 1994): 
 
1. To attract non-resident anglers to the province. As out of province 
spending holds the potential to contribute greatly to local income and job 
creation, this was the key area in which to develop added value. 
 
2. Increased use of outfitting. Research at the time suggested that anglers that 
use outfitting companies spent $1200 to $4000 per week on their fishing 
experience. 
 
3. Management of fisheries resources through Community Watershed 
Management. The report stated that, “Community Watershed Management 
goes to the heart of the matter. When the community sees itself as a 
stakeholder in the resources, this opens up the way to improved resources 
management… local participation in recreational fisheries management gives 
a direct way to earn an income through the community management 
organization” (3).  
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This influential report initiated the concept CWM. Using the ZEC system in Quebec as a 
guiding model, the intent of CWM was to maximize local employment through 
developing a world-class recreational fishery, while ensuring local participation and 
benefit in economic development. The report went on to suggest that CWM’s primary 
advantages over other models lay in the following areas (Buchanan et al. 1994): 1) its 
encouragement of respect for resources and the environment, 2) its cost effectiveness, 3) 
its allowance for government to more effectively target key issues, and, 4) its ability to 
localize economic benefits.  
The report extensively detailed the status of the industry and its potential for 
expansion. It found that the total economic value of the recreational fishery in 1990 was 
$106.4 million, and that that value could be increased by 50 percent under proposed plans 
to develop the industry (Buchanan et al. 1994). Key to this finding was that, on average, 
the difference in spending amongst three distinct user categories was stark (158): 
 
• Residents pay: $17.50/day 
• Canadians pay: $162.22/day 
• Non-Canadians pay: $279.07/day 
 
Further, the report suggested it should be possible to increase non-resident spending to 
$30 million per year (Buchanan et al. 1994, 160). Thus the attraction to the high-end of 
the market was self-evident. For this to materialize, the development of the outfitting 
industry and the expanded construction of lodges to accommodate the clientele would be 
required. This meant, of course, that compromises would be required in terms of access: 
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the report concluded that “local anglers will have to compromise in their use of quality 
fishing waters if economic benefits are to be realized” (170). Understandably, this proved 
to be an extremely controversial topic and eventual lightning rod for those wary of loss of 
access, privatization, and the perceived conflict between local anglers and wealthy 
outfitting lodges. 
Still, the overall economic benefits of a developed recreational fishery seemed 
undeniable, and moreover impossible to ignore at a time when the provincial and local 
economies were reeling from the moratoria. Looking to other provinces such as Quebec 
and Ontario for inspiration, as well as to countries such as Norway for their outfitting 
industry, planners and policy-makers often lamented at how Newfoundlanders appeared 
so resistant to change with respect to status quo operations (Pers. Comm., multiple). The 
LGL report further found that NL has lagged behind other provinces regarding strategic 
planning in environmental resource management (Buchanan et al. 1994). That stocks 
were depleted and in need of new and innovative approaches, and unemployment 
persistently high in rural areas, exacerbated the befuddlement of proponents with the 
resistance from some local resident anglers (McNeil 1997).  
The LGL report ultimately concluded that “communities should decide whether 
they want a low value food-fishery or a high value sport fishery; the two types of fishery 
are probably incompatible in most of the province’s waters,” continuing that “all 
stakeholders must give a little in order that the Newfoundland and Labrador society and 
economy can gain a lot,” and that the current situation required action: “if we do not 
produce positive change, biological, political, and financial constraints will force change, 
much of which will be negative” (170). Finally, the report recommended in its Action 
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Plan that four or five pilot projects for CWM be established throughout the province 
based on need for stock improvements as well as potential for development. It identified 
Indian Bay, Bay St. George, and the Torrent River as good candidates for this program. 
 
3.4 Community Watershed Management: a new deal? 
Two pilot projects were subsequently identified for the development of a CWM 
model that allowed for enhanced local decision-making in the management of their 
fishery resources, as well as a broader attempt at community-based resource management 
and environmental stewardship. The two areas selected for this trial were the Indian Bay 
watershed area in the Bonavista North region, and the ten rivers draining into Bay St. 
George on the southwest coast, with Harry’s River as the primary focus. They were 
selected on the basis that community groups already existed in both areas, that both areas 
had significantly degraded fish populations, and that both were seen to have significant 
potential to rebound their stocks and to develop a high-value industry in conjunction with 
community-based resource management principles (Pers. Comm., DFO2).  
Local residents in Indian Bay had already been undertaking stewardship work for 
some time, mainly to do with environmental clean up and initial attempts at stock 
recovery of the watershed’s once famous, trophy-sized brook trout. The community-
based group and eventual embodiment of CWM, IBEC, subsequently incorporated in 
1995 in order to avail of this pilot project funding opportunity. The organization then 
wrote up an economic development plan (Wicks 1996), funded through CASEC, to set 
the new operation in motion. 
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  Figure 6. The guiding document for CWM (Photo by S. Holisko) 
 
 In Bay St. George, the Bay. St. George South Development Association was also 
selected as a recipient of CASEC funding under the pilot project initiative. As one 
interviewee put it, “there wasn’t a lot of money involved” (Pers. Comm., BSG1). There 
was, however, a significant commitment on the part of federal and provincial decision-
makers to delegate authority on an experimental basis. According to one DFO official, 
“[The groups] were selected on the basis of priority identified by our science group… and 
also with some input from the Province” (Pers. Comm., DFO2). The document that 
framed the governance arrangements under the pilot projects was called Casting 
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Forward: A Framework for Community Watershed Management (1996), funded by and 
prepared for the ERC (see Figure 6). As reads the documents preface (1996, 1): 
 
The agreement presented here is designed to establish a public/private 
partnership between the Government of Canada, the government of 
Newfoundland and Labrador and local community organizations for the purpose 
of community watershed management in Newfoundland and Labrador. It will 
establish the framework for the operation of two pilot projects in community 
watershed management in Bay St. George and Indian Bay to promote 
community stewardship of the natural resources while providing continued 
public ownership and public access. 
 
The Casting Forward document also provided a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
between the two levels of government and the respective community group. This MOU 
clearly delineated the roles and responsibilities of each governing party, and delegated a 
level of decision-making authority to the community group.  
The pilot projects in CWM were regarded highly by some politicians, those 
involved through the ERC, and CASEC program managers. There was a true sense of 
optimism at the time that this could be a successful program that could provide 
sustainable, meaningful and substantive local employment opportunities for rural 
Newfoundlanders (Pers. Comm., multiple). Within the context of the loss of the 
commercial fisheries, the optimism and hopefulness in this directive is important. To this 
end, it is worthwhile to quote Doug House, former chairperson of the ERC, in a 
retrospective on the programs (1999, 184):  
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The Economic Recovery Commission’s most successful involvement in a specific 
regional economic development initiative was in recreational fisheries… Our 
most exciting involvement was at the community level in Indian Bay and Bay St. 
George, where the regional development associations took the lead at the grass-
roots level to gain control over the resource and begin to exploit it commercially 
as a basis of sustainable economic development. 
 
That House characterized the initiatives as “most successful” was perhaps an 
overstatement, but it nonetheless highlights the profile of the efforts being taken. Indeed, 
the projects had the political backing of Premier Wells, former Minister of Fisheries John 
Crosbie, as well as MHA and future premier Beaton Tulk (House 1999).  
 
3.4.1 The Model Rivers program 
Following from the pilot projects in Indian Bay and Bay St. George, CASEC 
program managers developed a new initiative on three additional river systems in the 
province that would utilize a similar consensus-based approach to watershed management 
and fisheries development. This was referred to as the Model Rivers program, which 
specifically focused on major salmon rivers in the province, and was developed through 
the Canada/Newfoundland Strategic Regional Diversification Agreement, following 
CASEC’s expiration in 1997 (McNeil 1997).  
The goal of this initiative was to devise a comprehensive and holistic plan for the 
management of, and development within, the watershed system, with a primary focus 
again on developing a recreational fishery (Pers. Comm., DFO2). The three areas selected 
were the Gander River led by the Gander River Management Association (GRMA), the 
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Humber River led by Humber River Watershed Model River Planning Group, and Eagle 
River/ Sandwich Bay led by the Sandwich Bay Watershed Management Association. 
These initiatives were added to the general docket of CWM by CASEC program 
managers, and later, once CASEC had expired, were funded through ACOA (McNeil 
1997).   
 
3.4.2 CASEC winds down 
Despite the new Model Rivers Program there remained significant challenges to 
overcome in the face of ever-changing political priorities and uncertain funding 
arrangements as CASEC came to an end. The election of Premier Brian Tobin in 1996 
brought with it the closure of the ERC, one of the principal proponents of rural economic 
development in general and recreational fisheries and CWM in particular. The year of 
1997 then brought an end to CASEC, an agreement that many felt was just starting to 
gain momentum in terms of achieving its objectives. As one interviewee stated: 
 
There should have been, and everyone thought automatically, ‘CASEC 2,’ another 
CASEC type agreement. The five program elements hit pretty well dead on. 
Tremendous work was done under it. The review it got was glowing in terms of, 
in that short period of time, what it had accomplished. ‘CASEC 2’ seemed 
automatic, because now we’ve got a salmon stock that is starting to revive, we’ve 
got major runs hitting the Exploits [River], we’ve got 25,000 coming into the 
Gander. Now was time to move into the next phase. CASEC expired, a year went 
by – and now this type of work, when you're talking assessment, you don’t want 
years when there's no data” (Pers. Comm., GRMA 1) 
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Thus CASEC expired without the working commitment nor the funds to support CWM. 
Many interviewees expressed disappointment as well as frustration that funding programs 
ceased to continue, however there was also the realization that core funding was never 
promised as an indefinite commitment (Pers. Comm., multiple). Therefore either a 
‘scaling-down’ of operation, as many groups experienced, or significant new 
developments in the way of funding opportunities, were required, post-CASEC. As noted 
in the quote above, when data gaps set in in terms of missing years of stock assessments, 
the momentum of these programs can fall off rapidly along with their scientific value.  
CASEC was, of course, a very expensive program and the science work took up 
much of those resources. In a province of currently 186 scheduled rivers spread across 
some 2.5 million kilometers of continental shelf, with a population of 530,000, the 
resources for DFO to conduct sustained scientific river monitoring are difficult to obtain 
(DFO 2016). As explained by one DFO official: “we were pumping a lot of money into 
those projects. The Gander River was costing several hundred thousand dollars a year to 
operate the counting fence and to provide advice. So after five or six years you had good 
information on the stock, and how the stock would perform, then it just wasn’t cost 
effective to keep doing the monitoring, its just too expensive” (Pers. Comm., DFO1).  
The primary goal of CASEC was to increase the economic returns from the 
recreational fisheries. There were five developmental program areas of varying reach 
across the conservation spectrum, but the underlying reasoning was always based on this 
fundamental bottom line. In essence, the money spent on CASEC programming was 
viewed as an investment, and as such would eventually be evaluated in terms of a return 
on this investment. This was the tone of a final report, in 1997, evaluating the CASEC 
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program. The report, funded by CASEC and conducted by Andy Rowe Consultants Inc., 
found that despite good work having been completed, the program was likely too short to 
bear out more useful conclusions on the status of salmon stocks and the recreational 
fishery. Regardless, CASEC was discontinued based on a combination of funding 
constraints, significant work having been completed to prove stock numbers, and 
inconclusive effectiveness of the program development efforts on the overall industry 
(Rowe 1997). The difficulty in the rationale not to continue the program based on these 
factors is that measures of return on investment were unclear, particularly when dealing 
with long term recovery programs and investments in science and research with 
environmental conservation aims, even if that conservation is intended to lead to 
improved economic outcomes. 
 
3.4.3 Privatization, or fear thereof: the pendulum swings 
According to the NLWF, there exists only two types of anglers in this province: 
“those who support salmon development for profit, and those who support salmon 
angling mostly as a tradition of our people and preserving a traditional freedom” (NLWF 
2013, n.p.). Groups such as the NLWF and their affiliates reject advocacy for increased 
controls on rivers related to access, pricing, or privilege related to fee-for-use of any kind. 
The nature of this reductive politics has groups like the NLWF, presently and historically, 
using the term ‘privatization’ as a catch-all for all new forms of access controls on 
scheduled rivers.  
 Salmon angling licensing in NL is a one-tier system in which the purchase of a 
license enables access to any scheduled river throughout the province, for that particular 
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season, based on a tag system subject to river-specific classification. In this system, the 
classification of the river determines the bag limit. There are benefits as well as 
challenges associated with this system. Benefits include ease of access (picture 
purchasing a separate license for every river that you choose to fish), administrative 
simplicity, and the general assurance of consistent controls of access. The principal 
challenge of this regime is that a general revenue stream does not incentivize the 
betterment of any particular river. Allowing a river-specific organization to administer its 
own fees would provide a vital localized revenue stream.  
As CASEC came to a close and watershed groups struggled with how to generate 
revenues to continue their stewardship and development initiatives, for the 1997 angling 
season, the GRMA was granted a trial approval from the Province for a river-specific 
license system. The $20 license fee would apply specifically to the Gander River for the 
season, so that there were for the first time two tiers of river licensing in the province 
(Daniels 2014). The intent was to create a vital revenue stream that would channel 
directly back into the coffers of GRMA for the use and betterment of the Gander River, 
instead of the license fees being collected and channeled back into the province’s general 
revenue.  
The experimental river-specific license had its advocates along with its detractors. 
It was popular amongst local users, those who have likely fished the Gander and only the 
Gander River their entire lives, as the cost was unchanged and the benefit localized (Pers. 
Comm., GRMA1). It was, however, extremely unpopular on the Avalon for anglers who 
tended to travel a distance to their destination, and to fish multiple rivers (Pers. Comm., 
GRMA1). It was also heavily criticized by the NLWF and by other outdoor rights 
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advocacy groups that popped up in this period such as the Citizens against Privatization 
and the Citizens Outdoors Rights Alliance (CORA). The NLWF threatened to bring the 
issue over the Gander River license to provincial courts before it was eventually and 
permanently scrapped after one season (Meyers 2000).  
Other watershed groups had floated similar ideas of user fees in order to channel 
those funds back into the resource and to keep their organization funded. There were 
serious proposals in place on the Humber for river-specific licensing, similar to what had 
been attempted on the Gander. In Indian Bay, IBEC had lobbied the province to 
implement a trout license either specific to the Indian Bay watershed, or a general trout 
license that would be province-wide (there is currently no trout licensing for NL 
residents). One interviewee recalled that 70 percent of trout anglers polled at the time 
would support a $10 trout license. He further explained, “we know how many anglers 
fish in Indian Bay. So based on the usage rate, [the Province would] refund us $10 times 
1000 anglers, or whatever the number was. This would then go right back into the 
protection, conservation, and enhancement of the Indian Bay watershed” (Pers. Comm., 
IBEC 6). This particular proposal was never put into practice, however. Instead the 
Gander River licensing experiment became a turning point for CWM in NL, galvanizing 
the growing public dissent towards the program (see Figure 7 for a depiction of the series 
of events that followed). 
The provincial government was ultimately forced to respond. In 1998, after 
growing public outcry that was still feeding off of the Gander River licensing experiment, 
the Province established a Committee of Minister and Members of the House Assembly 
to hold formal consultations with the public on the future management of the province’s 
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outdoor resources. The consultation process, which sought to include all concerned 
parties to build consensus on how to preserve public access to the outdoors and outdoor 
resources, involved 18 public meetings across all regions of the province (Government of 
NL 1999a).  
The report that the committee submitted, Protecting the Legacy: Report of the 
Committee on the Use of Outdoor Resources, is a highly revealing look at the public 
consultation process that government undertook to adjust its policy commitments 
regarding the management of crown wilderness lands held in “public trust” (Government 
of NL 1999a). The report touched on a broad range of topics including outdoor-use 
management, economic development, and general resource issues, though the primary 
focus squared centrally on the issue of “privatization” of public goods. The report 
supported the CWM concept and alleged that concerns over privatization were 
unfounded, but was nonetheless sensitive to public outcry and ultimately recommended a 
retreat on the part of the Province, due to the political fall out.  
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Figure 7. Timeline depiction of major events in the development of CWM after CASEC. 
 
The report Protecting the Legacy led directly to the formulation of a very 
significant policy mandate the following year. In 1999 the Tobin Government articulated 
its commitment to Newfoundlanders and their access to the outdoors through the policy 
document entitled Our Smiling Land: Government’s Vision for the Protection and Use of 
Newfoundland and Labrador’s Outdoor Resources (Government of NL 1999b). The title 
of the document was borrowed from the province’s official anthem “Ode to 
Newfoundland,” and the document itself is rife with literary references. In many ways it 
is a landmark document espousing the ideals and values of Newfoundlanders and 
Labradorians with respect to the use of the outdoors. Describing public Crown lands as 
the foundation of “our culture, tradition, and heritage” and an underpinning of “who we 
are as a people,” the document interestingly described the use of public lands as a 
“privilege” (as opposed to a right, as many opposed to CWM have described), one which 
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the government is committed to preserving in the name of “public trust” (Government of 
NL 1999b, 1). 
The document went on to make a sweeping set of government commitments to 
retain decision-making authority and to adhere to common property principles: the 
Province would remain a holder of the public trust, effectively disallowing Special 
Management Areas or localized governance arrangements with respect to outdoors lands 
and natural resources. This was elaborated through the retention of all licensing 
responsibilities, the affirmation that resource “privatization” would not be supported, and, 
crucially, an end to CWM. It proclaimed: “Government will retain decision-making 
authority, including in respect to licenses and fees, in the area of watershed management. 
In order to ensure that the interests of all residents of the province are protected, it will 
not delegate its decision-making power to stakeholder groups and communities” 
(Government of NL 1999b, 1). This 1999 document illustrates how the CWM program in 
NL ceased to be provincial policy, just three years after the pilot program had been 
launched.  
 
 3.4.4 “My God-given right to fish these waters” 
The talk of fee-for-use, and the one case of experimental licensing on the Gander, 
caused a flurry of fear and questionable information implying that public resources were 
in the process of being privatized en masse in the province. Rumors of toll gates being 
put up on backcountry roads or restricting access to local fishing pools became rampant. 
To be fair, the license proposal followed on events such as the 1991 ERC report 
recommending leasing of some salmon fishing areas (pools) to outfitters, contributing to 
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suspicions and fears of lost access among local anglers (Vodden et al. 2013). Further, 
many of the key development principles behind CWM described above were well aligned 
with neoliberal philosophy that favoured market based approaches. From 1995-98 the 
provincial government de-regulated 21 provincial parks as a cost saving measure and to 
prospect business opportunities, which undoubtedly stoked the public perception that 
government was operating on an agenda to privatize sections of public wilderness and 
natural resources (McGrath 1997; Ballam 2015). This was also a period of broader 
government divestment of key aspects of the public portfolio, not just in Newfoundland 
and Labrador, but across Canada, in the neo-liberal crusade to reduce the size of 
government (Bakker 2007).  
When considering distinctions made within common property theory of private 
ownership versus community-based stewardship models, there is little evidence, 
however, that CWM and related licensing proposals by watershed organizations were part 
of this broader provincial agenda to privatize significant portions of public lands nor 
nullify the ‘traditional rights’ of Newfoundlanders and their access to the outdoors. There 
was also no legal basis for privatization of these public watersheds.   
The policy and legal commitments of CWM aimed, in fact, to have the opposite 
effect. CWM was an open commitment that all parties would be explicitly invited to the 
table to be involved in decision-making for the benefit of the resource and those who use 
and depend on it, but under the existing legislative framework. Every document that was 
put forward under the programs of recreational fishery development and CWM contained 
an express commitment to public buy-in and local decision-making in the management of 
the resource (House 1999). That government devolved management, then pulled funding, 
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arguably compelled community groups such as GRMA to shift towards alternative 
revenue streams and principles that appeared to resemble privatization. Thus the policy 
espoused one objective, but the failed implementation forced at least the appearance of 
another. 
There emerged a rhetoric, primarily by the NLWF, of “the people” needing to 
“take back” the resource. An influential article by Owen Meyers in 2000, entitled 
“Taking Back the Commons,” documented the provincial government’s attempts to 
retrench and sell off public lands, followed by abandonment of the notion of 
government’s role as a holder of the “public trust” in the management of its natural 
resources (Meyers 2000). The charge of the NLWF was that CWM represented moneyed 
interests in the form of outfitters, developers, and powerful lobby groups such as the 
ASF, and not the general public, and certainly not the common angler. This charge, 
however, seems to deny what interviewees describe as core principles of CWM that 
included inclusiveness and community-involvement with goals of environmental 
stewardship, together with regional development and diversification. The make-up of 
these CWM organizations were open, inclusive, and democratic – literally anyone from 
the region could get involved and voice their concerns if they so chose. This is not to say 
that CWM was the only policy option for management of watersheds and their fisheries 
resources, however based on CBRM and IWM perspectives presented in Chapter 2 it is 
the argument of this paper that was a better option than the status quo for an evolving 
commitment towards rescaled approaches resource management, based on extensive 
government, community and industry research, consultation, and collaboration.  
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3.4.5 The fortress of government 
At the same time that public dissent was growing against CWM, inside the 
provincial government there was significant, complementary resistance to the notion of 
power-sharing with community groups invested in managing their resources at the local 
level. Doug House, in his retrospective on the ERC and the shortcomings of economic 
renewal in NL, attacks the nature of government bureaucracy generally, and senior level 
bureaucrats that span political administrations specifically. House highlights the 
challenges and barriers to such a policy directive in what he reveals as the greatest 
challenge to de-centralized governance within the highly resistant government 
bureaucracy (184): 
 
The recreational fishery project is an excellent example of how successful 
regional development in the Canadian context requires the cooperation of 
community-based groups with both orders of government. It is not enough to 
decentralize decision-making to community groups and expect them to succeed on 
their own. They need to be given the full support of government agencies that 
have jurisdiction over their resources. In some cases, as in the watershed 
management that is essential to successful recreational fisheries development, the 
community-based groups themselves must be delegated management control over 
the resource and its development. It is difficult, however, to bring various parties 
together, particularly given that most government officials are skeptical about the 
abilities of community groups and protective of their own regulatory authority.  
 
Thus we see the dual challenge of the governance implementation gap: skepticism of the 
abilities of ‘lower orders’ of government and non-government organizations on the one 
hand, and unwillingness to relinquish authority and decision-making on the other. An 
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interviewee furthered this point, explaining that senior bureaucrats had neither the interest 
nor intention of supporting the programs, neither financially nor politically: “That had not 
been their career. This [CWM initiative] was a politician’s program in their eyes, that was 
there to make all of these user groups feel they were part of the process, and that they had 
equal say and equal right. That was a great theoretical concept, to their mind, but in 
reality not how the resource needed to be managed” (Pers. Comm., HRW1). This is a 
powerful indictment of the shortcomings and realities of redefining governance 
arrangements, and a well documented one. All told, in the face of such resistance from a 
small but extremely vocal section of the public on the one hand, and internal government 
forces on the other, CWM and its local management groups seemed attacked from both 
sides. According to Alistair Allan, former member of the ERC who worked closely with 
designing the pilot project MOU between IBEC and the provincial and federal 
governments, amongst several key factors, it was failure to fight through a walled-off 
bureaucracy that ultimately killed the momentum of the CWM policy directive (from 
House 1999, 185):   
 
Crucial opposition concerns involved issues of ‘traditional rights,’ political 
resistance and public skepticism over a perceived new ‘power group.’ The main 
impediment, however, was none of these obvious problem areas, but an 
opposition stemming from a determined bureaucratic resistance to change, 
particularly in the provincial departments. The whole process of planning and 
negotiation took 6 years from inception to conclusion, and was constantly 
frustrated by many changes of official departments and even governments. It 
finally required approval by: 5 teams of lawyers, 2 federal Directors General, 2 
premiers, 2 Ministers of DFO, 2 Federal Deputy Ministers, 4 Provincial Ministers 
and 7 Provincial Departments. The agreement had to be accommodated without 
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change under the Federal Fisheries Act, the Provincial Wildlife Act, the Tourist 
Establishment Act and associated Regulations and the Provincial Lands Act. 
 
With frustrations mounting on the part of local managers feeling left without support 
from higher levels both administratively and financially, a small section of the public 
decrying privatization and infringement on traditional rights, and politicians and senior 
managers across government departments unable to deliver, CWM and the attendant 
recreational fisheries development ultimately reached an impasse.  
 
3.4.6 CWM organizations today  
The failure of the Gander license experiment can be understood as a political 
lightning rod that perhaps ‘turned the tide’ on momentum that had been gained in CWM 
development to that point, and dealt a significant blow to the profile of GRMA and 
groups like it (Pers. Comm., multiple). It was also a critical failure in the pursuit of a 
viable revenue stream, linked to neo-liberal policies of downloading costs and the 
resistance that that generated. As explained by one interviewee, the political blowback 
was stiff and persistent for a time, although it did eventually subside. Indeed, GRMA 
continued to successfully and substantively fulfill its mandate until eventually folding in 
2008, some 10 years later. Interviewees felt, however, that the profile of the organization 
was never the same.5   
                                                
5 An organization’s profile is an important indicator of the ability to fulfill its mandate. The concept and the 
importance of organizational profile will be discussed further in the following chapter, but it can be taken 
to embody the support, both politically, economically, and socially, it may enjoy from government and the 
community within which it operates (Robins 2007) 
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The following Table 3 details the current status of the original CWM groups. The 
table is defined by the geography encompassed, the issue orientation of the group (their 
primary motivating issue and/or mandate), the governance structure of the group, the 
amount of personnel employed, and the current status with a summary of years active. As 
detailed, IBEC is the only group that remains in a capacity today that is consistent with 
its original mandate in watershed management and increased local decision-making. 
